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A Note on “Hartz-Horowitz at Twenty”: The Case of French Canada

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In an assessment of the Hartz-Horowitz thesis, H. D. Forbes contends that the basic weaknesses of Hartzian theory “are most easily seen by examining its treatment of French Canada.”¹ He argues that to accept a Hartzian interpretation of French Canada would be like “swallowing a camel.” The debate over English Canada’s political culture—one that has been heated²—is depicted in comparison as merely “straining gnats” (297). Is this so? I want to propose the reverse: the power of Louis Hartz’s fragment theory is particularly illuminating in the case of French Canada and is consistent with both its history and historiography. The feudal French-Canadian fragment created a universe of implicit perceptions and values which shaped, limited, and then—with the liberal Quiet Revolution—exploded the kinds of politics that developed within it. Hemmed in by the physical pressure of anglophones all around, cut off from a France that was no more, the French-Canadian feudal fragment unfolded. It did so as the liberal

- 1 H. D. Forbes, “Hartz-Horowitz at Twenty: Nationalism, Toryism and Socialism in Canada and the United States,” this JOURNAL 20 (1987), 287-315, at 289. Quotations from this source are hereafter acknowledged parenthetically in the text.
- 2 See for example Conrad Winn and James Twiss, “The Spatial Analysis of Political Cleavages and the Case of the Ontario Legislature,” this JOURNAL 10 (1977), 287-310; Tom Truman, “A Scale for Measuring a Tory Streak in Canada and the United States,” this JOURNAL 10 (1977), 597-614; Rod Preece, “The Myth of the Red Tory,” *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 1 (1977), 3-28; Gad Horowitz, “The ‘Myth’ of the Red Tory?” *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 1 (1977), 87-88; and Gad Horowitz, “Notes on ‘Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada,’” this JOURNAL 11 (1978), 383-99.

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fragment did in the United States, but in a conservative rather than a liberal direction. It did so with a force that would have been stifled in Europe by the dominant and contending ideologies of liberalism and socialism respectively.

Forbes's interpretation of French Canada's experience begins with a semantic issue: whether a more appropriate label for the French-Canadian fragment would not be "Catholic" rather than "feudal." This complaint was anticipated and handled by Hartz but misinterpreted by Forbes: in using "broad terms broadly"³ for purposes of analytic convenience and generalization, Hartz adopted the Marxist triad of feudal (for the French-Canadian and Latin-American fragments), liberal or bourgeois (for the English-Canadian, American, and Dutch South-African fragments) and socialist or radical (for the Australian and British South-African fragments).⁴ The emergence of socialism in all societies—new and old—is a synthetic dualistic reaction in this schema to both feudalism (or conservatism or toryism as Gad Horowitz has labelled this outlook in English Canada)⁵ and liberalism. Socialism shares with each of these ideologies some common perspectives but not all since liberalism is the antithesis of conservatism.

Forbes does not fully grasp this ideological dynamic when he claims that the Hartz-Horowitz thesis "rests upon a simple law ('if toryism yesterday, then socialism today')" (309). Actually, the principle is "if toryism (or feudalism) *and* liberalism yesterday, then, *possibly*, socialism today." Although he cites two "Hartzian" analyses of prairie politics, nowhere do they cite Hartz or hint that the emergence of prairie socialism is a product of toryism or a feudal outlook.⁶ Hartz noted that his "single factor [analysis] cannot illuminate all situations, [nevertheless] it can still illuminate many" (*LTA*, 21). He reminded Horowitz when the latter was applying Hartz's theory to Canada that factors such as urbanization, class and the availability of private capital also help to explain—in conjunction with his theory of ideological fragmentation—the emergence of socialism and the impetus for state action such as nationalization in any given society.⁷

3 Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), 3. References to this source are hereafter parenthetical, using the abbreviation *LTA*.

4 Louis Hartz et al., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), 3. References to this source are hereafter parenthetical, using the abbreviation *FNS*.

5 Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 32 (1966), 143-71.

6 Nelson Wiseman, "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," *Queen's Quarterly* 88 (1981), 298-315; and Nelson Wiseman, "An Historical Note on Religion and Parties on the Prairies," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 16 (1981), 109-12.

7 Louis Hartz to Gad Horowitz, October 29, 1965. I am grateful to Gad Horowitz for providing access to his correspondence and files.

Abstract. In an assessment of Louis Hartz's fragment theory, H. D. Forbes contends that its basic weaknesses are most easily exposed in the case of French Canada. This article argues the opposite: Hartz's approach in this case is particularly illuminating rather than representing its Achilles' heel. Hartzian analysis is consistent with the historiography of French Canada. The growth of liberalism in the nineteenth century that Forbes points to in the French-Canadian fragment pales when placed in a comparative perspective as Hartz's theory requires. It is the mix of feudal and liberal ideas in the twentieth century that helps to explain the rise of social democratic forces like the Parti québécois.

Résumé. Dans une évaluation de la théorie du fragment de Louis Hartz, H. D. Forbes soutient que ses faiblesses principales sont les plus manifestement exposées dans le cas du Canada français. Cet article prétend le contraire : l'approche de Hartz dans ce cas est particulièrement éclairante plutôt que représentative de son talon d'Achille. L'analyse de Hartz est consistante s'agissant de l'historiographie du Canada français. La montée du libéralisme au 19^e siècle que Forbes met en évidence dans le fragment canadien-français pâlit lorsqu'on la place en perspective comparative comme l'exige la théorie de Hartz. C'est le mélange d'idées féodales et libérales au 20^e siècle qui permet d'expliquer l'avènement des forces social-démocrates telles que le Parti québécois.

Hartz selected the term "feudal" intentionally because, he wrote, it is "nebulous." He used it in the rather idiosyncratic way that de Tocqueville did. Hartz makes explicit that he was not technically referring to the actual institutions of the medieval world. He was, rather, referring to an outlook, an orientation to politics, an ideological disposition. "'Liberalism,'" he reminded the reader, "is an even vaguer term, clouded as it is by all sorts of modern social reform connotations, and even when one insists on using it in the classic Lockian sense . . ." (*LTA*, 3-4), it will not fit perfectly the thesis he pursued. Nevertheless, despite the definitional problems, he settled for the term "liberal" in the title of his most famous book, one that won the highest professional awards in its field. Are we assisted or hindered in the study of the comparative history of new societies by substituting the triad of "Catholic-liberal-socialist," as Forbes's objection would have us do, for that of "feudal-liberal-socialist"? The terms "Catholic" and "feudal" are complementary rather than contradictory in the case of French Canada. To be a French Canadian, until relatively recently, was to be a pre-Enlightenment Catholic. "Catholic" or "feudal," both approaches could agree on "pre-liberal" in the case of French Canada, so let us not ride on the problem of definition for our primary concern is the interpretive power of Hartz's comparative theory.

What Hartz refers to when he employs the generic label "feudal" (or "pre-liberal" to meet Forbes's objection) are the basic patterns of thought in a society. In the case of French Canada he is referring to a collectivist, organic, hierarchical and co-operative outlook in contrast to a liberal society's theoretical stress on the primacy of primordial, competing, atomistic, free individuals as in the cases of the English-Canadian and American fragments. In a European context it is the contrast between the ideological perspectives of the ancien régime and that of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. It is

government designed for humans by God or passed on by the traditional wisdom of the ages. It is certainly not government made by free people for equal people as liberal contract theorists would have it. It is the difference between currency that reads "liberté, égalité, fraternité" and one—like that of the Vichy Régime—that read "travail, famille, patrie." Hartz's thesis and the insights offered by his holistic, comparative perspective are not refuted by the simple demonstration that French-Canadian delegates split evenly on whether or not to favour Confederation.⁸

Forbes asserts that liberalism grew steadily and surely in French Canada between the Conquest and the end of the Second World War. What he describes in this period, in contrast to Hartz's unfolding of a pre-liberal fragment, is the flowering of liberal institutions. As evidence he cites the rebellions, responsible government, the broadening of the franchise, the growth of political parties, the establishment of public schools, the Instituts Canadiens "and generally the growth of a liberal democratic regime" (294). Hartz and Kenneth McRae, who first applied Hartzian theory in Canada, identified but a streak of *rouge* in the French-Canadian fragment, just as Horowitz later identified an even stronger streak of toryism (or pre-liberalism) in English Canada. But Forbes goes far beyond identifying a streak or touch of liberalism in French Canada. His account has liberalism dominating the political culture with the Catholic ultramontanes merely reacting to it. Moreover, in this view, the Catholic reaction "held no brief for feudalism" (294). Rather it favoured "corporatism." It is ironic and supportive of Hartz's theory that Forbes selects "corporatism," for this is precisely the word Hartz considered using in place of "feudalism" but discarded, as Forbes notes, because it is not as clearly understood (292-93). That the concept of "corporatism" is as prevalent as it is in the Quebec literature,⁹ and as absent as it is in the American literature, is another way of expressing the relative presence of feudalism in the French-Canadian fragment and its relative absence in the American fragment.

In Forbes's depiction of French Canada's history the ultramontanes appear as a minority, merely "the important opposition to this broad trend" of liberalism (294). This is revisionist history indeed and is best confronted by performing the type of comparative experiment for which the Hartzian thesis was designed. Place Forbes's "liberal" French Canada next to the liberalism of English Canada or the

8 Walter C. Soderlund, Ralph C. Nelson, and Ronald H. Wagenberg, "A Critique of the Hartz Theory of Political Development as Applied to Canada," *Comparative Politics* 12 (1979), 63-85.

9 See for example Clinton Archibald, "Corporatist Tendencies in Quebec," in Alain G. Gagnon (ed.), *Quebec: State and Society* (Toronto: Methuen, 1984), 353-64.

United States or France and what are the results? It pales. Read, for example, de Tocqueville's account of America and then Durham's of French Canada. Who is the French-Canadian equivalent of Egerton Ryerson, John Dewey, or Saint-Simon? Who is there to challenge Lionel Groulx who approvingly cited the dicta of Maistre rather than Voltaire or Rousseau? In *La Naissance d'une race*, Groulx refers to the French-Canadian nation as possessing "through its faith and from its ancestors the sovereign law of hierarchic progress... the dignity of morals, respect for the laws of life, the peace of families and classes" and placing them "above all material grandeurs."¹⁰ The nationalist canons of Canon Groulx coincided with those of pre-liberalism not liberalism. It was a nationalism that represented "the rejection of liberalism, the protection of a traditional rural life-style, freedom from government intervention, and provincial autonomy."¹¹

Who are the Jacobins of French Canada and when is the Enlightenment? Can the never-too-lively liberalism of Papineau be compared to that of Mackenzie or Jackson or Jefferson? Why do both Fernand Ouellet and Fernand Dumont claim that Papineau's economics were guided by "a feudal model"?¹² Although at first sight Papineau appears to be a liberal, at a deeper level of analysis he remains *ancien, préévolutionnaire, organiciste*. It is French Canada's feudal nationalism that clouds whatever liberalism it manages to throw up. "There is a democratic movement in French Canada," noted Hartz, "but when we abstract the nationalist elements from it, it shrinks in force" (*FNS*, 30). Papineau was keen on assailing English oppression but not seigneurial power and was a landowner who prided himself on his social status. His Patriotes were out of touch with the illiterate habitant. Papineau's liberalism and the later *rougisme* of the Institut Canadien need to be noted but not stressed. To do so would be "a delusion, an error in perspective."¹³

Perspective is especially lost when French Canada is examined non-comparatively as Forbes does and Hartz never did. Hartz's approach requires hovering above a number of political and philosophical playing fields, constantly comparing and contrasting, pushing to see how far one can take the idea of ideological fragmentation in a comparative historical setting. By not comparing French-Canadian

10 Quoted in Ramsay Cook, *The Maple Leaf Forever* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971), 125.

11 François-Pierre Gingras and Neil Nevitte, "Nationalism in Quebec: An Incomplete Secular Revolution," in Paul Fox and Graham White (eds.), *Politics: Canada* (6th ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987), 244.

12 Denis Monière, *Ideologies in Quebec* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 102.

13 Louis Balthazar, "Les idées politiques de Louis-Joseph Papineau: une étude comparative" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1970); cited in Kenneth D. McRae, "Louis Hartz's Impact on Political Thought in Canada," paper presented at the Harvard University Symposium on Louis Hartz, January 1987.

liberalism to its English-Canadian, American and European counterparts, we may easily overlook—as I am suggesting Forbes does—its shallow and imposed character. French-Canadian liberalism was neither a revolutionary ideology as it had been in France nor a reigning one as it was in English Canada, Britain and the United States. Hartz's main point was that "nothing is gained analytically for a subject by sheer stress on its 'uniqueness.'" ¹⁴ Any given national history has to be placed in a wider comparative perspective so as to broaden rather than narrow our appreciation of it. Thus we learn more about the character of French Canada's history when we relate it to the history of other societies. Hartz saw French Canada's liberalism as he saw America's feudalism: present, but on the whole insignificant. It was easily overwhelmed by the dominant feudalism in French Canada just as feudalism was overwhelmed by the dominant liberalism in the United States.

The feudal ideology became the conscious nationalist ideology of the French-Canadian fragment. The values that François-Xavier Garneau, the pioneer of historical writing in French Canada, and Groulx were seeking to discover in the past were those which would confront, not accommodate or extend, the liberalism imposed by the British after the Conquest. When the British were thanked, as they were in Thomas Chapais' *Cours d'histoire du Canada*, it was, paradoxically, for their pre-liberalism which along with God "providentially" saved French Canada "from the horrors of the French Revolution, the anti-clericalism, and materialism of modern France," ¹⁵ the infidel. French Canada's clergy, the leading political class, opposed rather than endorsed the rebellion of 1837. "Certainly one can hardly imagine a popular movement, a Jacksonian drive, for example, being crushed by the clergy as the Rougists were crushed" (*FNS*, 30). There was no liberal echo in the proudful boast that French Canada's language was closer to that of the Golden Age under Louis XIV than anything spoken in Europe.

Let us push the comparative perspective. As in English Canada and the United States a philosophy of order, stability and agrarianism held sway in French Canada, but there was nothing "grit" about it as there was in Ontario and nothing "populist" about it as in the United States. Where is the French-Canadian equivalent of the "Progressives" who appeared in the Congress and the House of Commons and who swept to power in a number of states and provinces? Surely, it is not the Créditistes. If it is Laurendeau's Bloc Populaire, why did it not appear before the 1930s and why did it fare so poorly, winning but two seats? Why was his nationalism so much more influenced by Groulx than by

14 Hartz to Horowitz, October 29, 1965.

15 Cook, *The Maple Leaf Forever*, 121.

Laurier?¹⁶ Conversely, where were the equivalents of seigneurialism which, although commuted in French Canada as a sign of liberalism as Forbes notes, had never existed on any scale in Anglo-America to begin with? Why was the Quebec legislature still dealing with the remaining rights of the seigneurs in 1935 (*FNS*, 225)?¹⁷ Why were the corporatist and feudal notions of Salazar's Portugal, so far removed from what liberalism represented, the model that Quebec's clergy cited for dealing with the modern world (*FNS*, 32-33)?¹⁸ Who and what were the French-Canadian counterparts of J. S. Woodsworth, Salem Bland and the social gospel in English Canada?

French-Canadian historians like Maurice Séguin and Guy Frégault did detect a developing bourgeoisie before the Conquest, something historians Marcel Trudel, Jean Hamel and Fernand Ouellet disputed because of "an atmosphere of *feudal* paternalism." But even Séguin and Frégault wrote of its social decapitation in the nineteenth century. "The whole structure of the feudal order" writes Ramsay Cook, paraphrasing Ouellet, "was hostile to the emergence of such a class."¹⁹ The liberalism that Forbes identifies in Quebec was imposed as a consequence of the Conquest and the influx of the Loyalists. It was one of the "benefits" of occupation; it did not spring up from the French-Canadian nation. When liberal sentiments were expressed by Henri Bourassa, they came from "a loyal son of the Church and a temperamental conservative," one who "tried to reconcile liberalism with Ultramontanism."²⁰ It was the lack of liberalism, not its presence, in the French-Canadian experience that Pierre Trudeau cited as the impediment to democracy in Quebec. The Canadiens had not been "psychologically nor politically prepared" for representative government.²¹ What held sway in the nineteenth century was pre-liberalism.

The story does not change much in the first half of the twentieth century. "In 1958," lamented Trudeau, "French Canadians must begin to learn democracy from scratch."²² Contrast Duplessis' modus operandi to that of King or Roosevelt. He was like a "prince" who rewarded friends, punished opponents, exacted pay-offs from contractors and all in the name "of coarse peasant good sense,"²³ a

16 Ramsay Cook, *Canada and the French Canadian Question* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), 106.

17 *Quebec Statutes*, 25-26 George V, chap. 82; *Seigniorial Rent Abolition Act*, 299-308.

18 Mason Wade, *The French Canadians, 1760-1945* (New York, 1955), 837.

19 Cook, *The Maple Leaf Forever*, 137-38; emphasis added.

20 *Ibid.*, 106; and Monière, *Ideologies in Quebec*, 183.

21 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), 104.

22 *Ibid.*, 114.

23 Marcel Rioux, "The Development of Ideologies in Quebec," in Richard Schultz et al. (eds.), *The Canadian Political Process* (3rd ed.; Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Win-

phrase no one would think of placing on the style of corruption and patronage in Anglo-America. Would the Padlock Law have been tolerated in English Canada or the United States? When the Union Nationale was defeated in 1960 the government of Quebec had fewer than a dozen economists and no Department of Education, a comment on how "public" Quebec's public schools were. All this was hardly consistent with "the growth of a liberal democratic regime" as Forbes refers to Quebec's experience. There had been, in contrast, a "lag" in political modernization.²⁴

The French-Canadian experience to 1960 is one of reaction not reform, an excellent example of what Hartz termed "the impulse of the fragment to flee in the face of new experience" (*FNS*, 47). It was a nationalist response to the tory-touched liberalism represented by the Loyalists and the revolutionary liberalism of 1789. If one needs more evidence on the relative status of liberal and feudal ideas in French Canada's political culture, consider the following, broadcast by Radio-Canada on election day, 1956:

Sovereign authority, by whatever government it is exercised, is derived solely from God, the supreme and eternal principle of all power. . . . It is therefore an absolute error to believe that authority comes from the multitudes, from the masses, from the people, to pretend that authority does not properly belong to those who exercise it, but that they have only a simple mandate revocable at any time by the people. This error, which dates from the Reformation, rests on the false principle that man has no other master than his own reason. . . . All this explanation about the origin, the basis, and the composition of this alleged [!] sovereignty of the people is purely arbitrary. Moreover, if it is admitted, it will have as a consequence the weakening of authority, making it a myth, giving it an unstable and changeable basis, stimulating popular passions and encouraging sedition.²⁵

Hartz's theory applied to French Canada is corroborated by the independent analysis of Marcel Rioux, the Quebec sociologist. He analyzed Quebec's history as a succession of three ideological eras. The first, running through the last half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries was "the ideology of conservation," one featuring the outlook that Hartz labelled feudalism. Duplessis' government exhibited "many characteristics of preindustrial society which tallied exactly with those of the ideology of conservation."²⁶ A second ideology, "the ideology of contestation and recoupment," emerged in the late 1940s, came to power in the form of the Quiet Revolution of the

ston, 1979), 106; originally published as "Sur l'évolution des idéologies au Québec," in *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie* 1 (1968), 95-124.

24 Dale Posgate and Kenneth McRoberts, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), chap. 5.

25 Quoted in Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 110-11.

26 Rioux, "The Development of Ideologies in Quebec."

1960s and, according to Rioux, "can be linked to the liberal tradition." The third ideology, "the ideology of participation and development," emerged as he was writing in the late 1960s. It identified with worldwide, socialist movements for decolonization and liberation. The outside world was crashing in ("bombardment," as Hartz put it) on the French-Canadian fragment.

Rioux, writing before René Lévesque's social democratic Parti québécois had contested an election, described in a "Hegelian" manner identical to Hartz's how this third ideology drew on some aspects and rejected other aspects of the two antecedent eras. It agreed with liberals that Quebec must be modernized, but the model for emulation was not necessarily liberal North America. This third, socialist ideology reached back to the past ("Je me souviens" was stamped on license plates) as did the ideology of conservatism. It stressed Quebec's history as an exploited and dominated society, but it rejected the old elites as hopelessly reactionary.

The PQ synthesized *la survivance* with *rattrapage* and came up with *dépassage*. It wanted to retrieve the feudal notion of organic community in the face of growing liberalism. Paradoxically, it required the liberalism of the Quiet Revolution to set the stage. Because the PQ was both appealing to tradition and promising change, and because it was not English like the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation-New Democratic party it could not be dismissed as heretically foreign as the CCF had been in Quebec. By the 1970s, social democracy of the PQ variety was an acceptable, popular, moderate alternative to the more radical and sectarian leftist groupings like the Front de libération du Québec, the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN), the Communist party, Trotskyists, and the Parti socialiste du Québec. They had sprung up, suddenly, swiftly, with the demise of Duplessis and the diminished but continuing presence of the feudal outlook. The link between conservatism and socialism is reflected, among other places, in Fernand Dumont's *The Vigil of Quebec*, in which the qualities and values of French-Canadian union leaders are characterized as anti-capitalist, Catholic and collectivist; that is, pre-liberal.²⁷ This is precisely what English-Canadian socialists liked about them. The linkages and interaction among feudalism, liberalism and socialism in Quebec were reflected in the very creation of the PQ. It drew on the former Liberal Lévesque to be its leader and amalgamated Pierre Bourgault's unquestionably left-wing and socialist RIN with the unquestionably right-wing and conservative Ralliement national led by a Créditiste.

Horowitz, building on Hartz, observed this phenomenon in the 1960s. Before the Quiet Revolution, he noted, the Catholic unions

27 Fernand Dumont, *The Vigil of Quebec* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 74.

denounced the international unions as too radical and socialist to consider joining; after the Quiet Revolution they denounced them as not socialist enough. Quebec's Catholic union movement went from attacking the American Federation of Labor for discussing the public ownership of railways to attacking it for its declaration of allegiance to private enterprise.²⁸ Precisely because of this dialectical transformation of Quebec politics, Horowitz, the socialist political activist rather than detached political scientist, favoured English and French Canada staying together. He did so "because French Canada may now be advancing farther along the road to social democracy than English Canada [so] that if we stick with the French, we can learn something from them in that regard."²⁹

Nationalism and its different manifestations in Quebec came full circle as Hartz suggested it could: a feudal past when combined with a sudden influx of liberal ideas in the mid-twentieth century produced the environment where the seeds of socialism sprouted. Quebec socialists since the 1960s have drawn on both the collectivist and organic principles of French Canada's feudal past and the egalitarian and rationalist components of its liberal Quiet Revolution. Conversely, they have rejected the hierarchical authoritarianism of the feudal outlook and the competitive individualistic outlook of liberalism.

Was the PQ socialist? It thought so and applied to join the Socialist International but was rebuffed due to the NDP's membership and the rule of only one socialist member party per country. Some policy evidence of the PQ's socialism—at least in its first term in office—was its legislating the most progressive provincial income tax system in the country, the highest provincial minimum wage, the waiver of fines against thousands of strikers and the most severe anti-strikebreaking laws of any province. Government ministers referred to Quebec as a "corporate state" and the asbestos industry and parts of the automobile insurance industry were nationalized. The PQ became the leading Canadian example of a classic mass party, using plebiscites to determine policy and leadership and relying on a large number of small financial contributions rather than on a small number of large ones. It came to power with the solid support of the organized labour movement and declared "itself social democratic on the German and Swedish model."³⁰ Lévesque's social democratic agenda, one similar to the

28 Gad Horowitz, transcript of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio programme, "Viewpoint," (n.d., 1965).

29 Gad Horowitz in conversation with George Grant, transcript of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation television programme, "Ideals of Democracy and Social Reality," January 9, 1966.

30 Raymond Hudon, "Political Parties and the Polarization of Quebec Politics," in Hugh G. Thorburn (ed.), *Party Politics in Canada* (4th ed.; Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 228-42; and Jean-Pierre Beaud, "The Parti Québécois from René

NDP's and influenced also by liberalism, was outlined in his *My Quebec*: reducing income disparities, ensuring equality of opportunity and increasing participation in political life and enterprise.³¹

One could, of course, argue that the PQ was not socialist but bourgeois or petty bourgeois.³² One could also question the socialist credentials of the NDP as Forbes does (301-02). But this is an unhelpful diversion in the quest to account for the quite different political histories and parties of French Canada, English Canada and the United States. If Ed Broadbent's NDP is not socialist, why did the Socialist International elect him as its vice-president and why did it employ an NDP functionary like Robin Sears to serve in its own bureaucracy? Why did former French prime minister Pierre Mauroy point out that "he was attending the [Lévesque] funeral as a representative of the French Socialist Party?"³³ The NDP and the PQ have been no more or less socialist than social democratic parties in Britain, Scandinavia, other parts of Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand. They all attend conventions of the Socialist International and not the Liberal International where Canada's Liberals, America's Democrats and Europe's largely liberal Radical parties congregate. One is more likely to find the American Edward Kennedy or the Canadian Pierre Trudeau at the latter. Although Jacques Parizeau and Pierre-Marc Johnson in 1987 disagreed on how *indépendantiste* the PQ ought to be, Parizeau insisted that it must reaffirm its "social democratic objectives."³⁴ Jean Chrétien, David Peterson, or John Turner would never use such language. This ideological self-categorization is telling, more revealing than lumping all of Canada's parties—in English Canada as well as Quebec—under the common, indiscriminate rubric of "liberal."

Hartzian theory does not claim that the rise of socialist ideas and parties in Quebec's politics in the 1960s and 1970s was exclusively the result of the interaction of feudal and liberal ideas in the political culture. Hartz and those who applied his theory understood that Quebec was going from being rural and Catholic to becoming urban and secular. The Québécois were moving from the farms and churches to the factories and new government offices. In brief, some of the material conditions necessary for the rise of socialist ideology were being created even before the Quiet Revolution. But so had they been in the United States, Hartz would have quickly noted. Unlike the American case, however,

Lévesque to René Lévesque," in Hugh G. Thorburn (ed.), *Party Politics in Canada* (5th ed.; Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 238.

31 René Lévesque, *My Quebec* (Toronto: Methuen, 1979).

32 See Gilles Bourque, "Class, Nation, and the Parti Québécois," in Gagnon (ed.), *Quebec: State and Society*, 124-47; and Jorge Niosi, "La nouvelle bourgeoisie canadienne-française," *Les Cahiers du socialisme* 1 (1978).

33 *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 6, 1987.

34 *Ibid.*, October 5, 1987.

social democracy of the PQ variety was viable because the feudal tradition in Quebec—unlike the liberal tradition in America—had been confronted, shattered and transfigured by its antithesis: liberalism. Because liberalism emerges as a major force in Quebec as late as it does—only in the mid-twentieth century—the rise of socialism is retarded, appearing much later than in English Canada. Whether socialism emerged in English Canada because of the presence of a significant tory streak in the liberal fragment—Horowitz's landmark contribution in applying the Hartzian approach—is not our concern here (although I would prefer, like Tom Truman, to stress the direct role of transplanted British socialists).³⁵ That socialism emerged in French Canada as a result of the dynamic, synthetic interaction of feudal and liberal ideas is easier to demonstrate and consistent with the historiography of French Canada. The history of the French-Canadian fragment is perhaps the most powerful confirmation of the insights offered by the Hartzian approach, not its Achilles' heel.

35 Tom Truman, "A Critique of Seymour M. Lipset's Article 'Value Differences, Absolute or Relative: The English-speaking Democracies,'" *this JOURNAL* 4 (1971), 497-525.